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OF COMPENSATION DISCLOSURES UNDER DODD-FRANK 
Michael Ohlrogge* 
ABSTRACT 
One of the more controversial measures of the Dodd-Frank bill is its 
requirement that companies report the ratio of their CEO’s compensation 
to that of their median employee. Critics of this provision have claimed that 
for large companies with employees and subsidiaries throughout the world, 
compliance with this measure alone could cost millions of dollars a year, 
due to the difficulties in identifying the median employee. This paper 
demonstrates that the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is 
charged with implementing this provision, has the latitude to direct 
companies to calculate the figure using a statistical sampling procedure 
which would greatly reduce the costs of compliance while still achieving a 
satisfactory degree of reporting accuracy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal regulators have had more than a few headaches as they have 
sought to implement the remarkably broad but at times maddeningly vague 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act. The question of how to implement the provisions of Dodd-Frank 
dealing with executive compensation has proved to be particularly 
vexatious and controversial. Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank instructs the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to amend the executive 
compensation provisions of Regulation S-K, Item 402, so as to require 
companies to disclose the median annual total compensation of all 
employees apart from the chief executive officer, the total annual 
compensation of the chief executive officer, and the ratio between these two 
numbers.1 
This provision, which was introduced during the final stages of 
negotiation over the Dodd-Frank bill and received relatively little attention 
prior to the bill’s passage,2 has since become one of the more hotly debated 
and contentious issues concerning the implementation of the new law. 
Critics of the provision have claimed that it will saddle corporations with 
millions of dollars a year in additional compliance costs, hurting 
competitiveness and discouraging job growth just when the economy needs 
these most. The crux of the matter lies in section 953(b)’s somewhat 
peculiar wording, calling upon corporations to calculate median employee 
compensation using the same comprehensive metric by which they 
currently tally executive compensation. The exacting requirements of this 
metric currently encompass more than 40 pages of detailed procedures for 
tabulating the precise value of nearly every conceivable benefit that a 
corporation can bestow upon its employees.3 
In numerous meetings with SEC officials and hundreds of pages of 
comment letters submitted to the agency, many companies and trade 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
tit. IX, sub. E, § 953(b), 124 Stat. 1904 (2010). 
2 H.R. REP. NO. 112-42, pt. 1, at 1–2 (2011). 
3 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2011). 
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associations have expressed their concerns with this provision.4 They have 
argued that if taken literally, § 953(b) would require them to apply this 
exhaustive calculation (which includes such elements as net present value 
of defined benefit pension plans—a potentially tricky accounting figure to 
generate) to hundreds of thousands of different employees, working for 
hundreds of different subsidiaries in dozens of different countries, paid in 
dozens of different currencies and administered through divergent and 
incompatible payroll and accounting systems. Many companies have 
worried that without such exhaustive calculations, it will be impossible to 
identify the precise median employee—that is, the employee who receives 
more compensation than 50% of the company’s employees and less 
compensation than 50% of the company’s employees.5 
Some of those concerned about the implementation of 953(b) have 
gone so far as to seek complete repeal of the measure. On March 14th, 
2011, Rep. Nan Hayworth (R-NY19) introduced H.R. 1062, the 
Burdensome Data Collection Relief Act, directed explicitly and exclusively 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 See, e.g., Letter from Timothy J. Bartl, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Ctr. on Exec. 
Comp., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Secs. and Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 11, 2011), http:// 
www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-compensation/executivecompensation-79.pdf; Written 
Testimony, Darla C. Stuckey, Senior Vice President, Policy and Advocacy, Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys 
and Governance Prof’ls (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-
compensation/executivecompensation-20.pdf.; and Letter from Mark E. Warren, Vice President, Tax 
and Fin., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Secs. and Exch. Comm’n 
(Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-compensation/executive 
compensation-43.pdf. For a full list of submitted comments and meetings with SEC officials, see 
generally http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-compensation/executive-compensation. 
shtml. 
5 See, e.g., Letter from Timothy J. Bartl, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Ctr. on 
Exec. Comp., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Secs. and Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 1, 2010), http:// 
www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-compensation/executivecompensation-8.pdf (arguing that 
“[b]ecause the definition of median means ‘midpoint,’ depending on how the phrase ‘all employees’ is 
defined, companies could be required to calculate pay as specified by the proxy rules for each individual 
employee globally and then determine the median of those values. For large employers, this means they 
will have to accurately calculate pay for tens of thousands and in some cases, hundreds of thousands of 
employees to determine the median.”) 
See also Letter from Mark E. Warren, Vice President, Tax and Fin., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Secs. and Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/df-title-ix/executive-compensation/executive compensation-43.pdf (arguing, “[a]t the 
extreme, this would require an issuer to calculate the salary, bonus, stock awards, option awards, non- 
equity incentive plan compensation, change in pension value and nonqualified deferred compensation 
earnings, and all other compensation for each employee—potentially tens or even hundreds of thousands 
of individuals for the largest U.S. employers.”). 
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at repealing § 953(b) of Dodd-Frank.6 This bill was favorably reported by 
the House Financial Services Committee on June 22, 2011, and is currently 
awaiting a vote by the full House of Representatives.7 
Supporters of 953(b) have been no less vigorous in their efforts. 
Numerous institutional investors, representing hundreds of billions of 
dollars of corporate equity holdings, have for some time been frustrated by 
skyrocketing rates of executive compensation, which they see as being 
unrelated to or even sometimes negatively correlated with company 
performance.8 Many such investors, joined by a host of corporate 
governance and financial accountability organizations and private citizens, 
have submitted more than two hundred of their own comment letters to the 
SEC.9 Proponents argue that the provision will provide a much-needed 
tether to reality for executive compensation. They claim that the CEO to 
median worker compensation ratios will enable investors and executive 
compensation committees to compare CEO compensation to something 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 Burdensome Data Collection Relief Act, H.R. 1062, 112th Cong. (as reported by H.R. Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., June 22, 2011), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112-1062. 
7 Id. 
8 JIM COLLINS, GOOD TO GREAT: WHY SOME COMPANIES MAKE THE LEAP . . . AND OTHERS 
DON’T 49 (2001) (noting that amongst the companies he studied who had exceptional stock performance 
over sustained periods, CEO compensation was on average lower than at companies whose performance 
was more mediocre.). See also Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 7 (2005) (noting that there is no indication that increases in company size or 
improvements in performance can explain a large portion of increases in executive compensation). See 
also Council of Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance Policies, 10–11, http://www.cii.org/ 
CouncilCorporateGovernancePolicies (adopted Dec. 21, 2011) (noting that executives should not be 
excessively paid and that their compensation should be “reasonable and rational with respect to critical 
factors such as . . . compensation paid to other employees.”). 
9 See, e.g., Letter from Stu Dalheim, Director, Shareholder Advocacy, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, U.S. Secs. and Exch. Comm’n (May 27, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/ 
executive-compensation/executivecompensation-75.pdf (noting that a high CEO to median worker 
compensation ratio can indicate increased risks of employee turnover); Letter from Timothy Smith, 
Senior Vice President, Derector of ESG S’holder Engagement, Walden Asset Mgmt., to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Secs. and Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-
ix/executive-compensation/executivecompensation-68.pdf (noting that “[h]igh levels of disparity 
[between CEO and median worker pay] may breed mistrust in the workplace that dampens 
productivity”); see also Letter from Rick Wartzman, Exec. Dir., Drucker Institute, to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Secs. and Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-
ix/executive-compensation/executivecompensation-60.pdf (submitted Feb. 17, 2011) (noting that famed 
management guru Peter Drucker advocated no more than a 25:1 ration between CEO and average 
worker compensation, noting that higher ratios impede teamwork, particularly between the CEO and 
middle-management). 
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other than simply the sky-high compensation packages of other CEOs.10 
Naturally, these proponents of the provision have also tended to dispute 
claims by corporations and trade associations that the provision will be 
prohibitively expensive to implement.11 
As is often the case, however, the debate between proponents and 
opponents of the measure has generated more heat than light. Many of 
those commenting in opposition to the proposal have urged patently 
unworkable solutions, such as that the SEC simply ignore the law and 
implement the provision in ways directly contrary to the specific wording 
of section 953(b). Thus, for example, one group of compensation 
consultants wrote to the SEC requesting that the agency implement the law 
using the mean rather than the median worker compensation, as the law 
explicitly requires.12 Likewise, the Center on Executive Compensation, a 
trade association that deals with matters of executive compensation, 
requested that the SEC ignore certain aspects of the compensation 
calculation procedures in Regulation S-K, Item 402, even though the law 
explicitly requires that such procedures be used.13 Proponents of the 
measure, for their part, have generally just asserted that claims of excessive 
costs are overblown, while failing to offer a convincing picture of how the 
law can indeed be implemented at a reasonable cost.14 
This article proposes a way out of the morass that discussions of 
Dodd-Frank’s section 953(b) have currently reached. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission can implement section 953(b) by instructing 
                                                                                                                           
 
10 See, e.g., Letter from Timothy Smith, Senior Vice President, Dir. of ESG S’holder 
Engagement, Walden Asset Mgmt. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Secs. and Exch. Comm’n 
(Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-compensation/executive 
compensation-68.pdf. 
11 See, e.g., Letter from Americans for Financial Reform to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y U.S. 
Secs. and Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-
compensation/executivecompensation-63.pdf. 
12 Letter from Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc. to Chairman Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Secs. and 
Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-compensation/ 
executivecompensation-6.pdf. 
13 Letter from Center on Executive Compensation to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Secs. and 
Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-compensation/ 
executivecompensation-8.pdf. 
14 See, e.g., Letter from Walden Asset Management to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Secs. 
and Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-compensation/ 
executivecompensation-68.pdf. 
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companies to identify their median employee through a process of statistical 
sampling. Such sampling is already widely used by numerous other 
administrative agencies, and the Supreme Court has recently upheld the 
discretion of agencies to determine how technical measures such as 
medians are to be calculated. In addition to laying out the case for the legal 
permissibility of such an interpretation by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, this article proposes the outlines of a specific sampling 
methodology which would allow a satisfactory degree of precision while 
minimizing compliance costs. 
II. LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A STATISTICAL SAMPLING 
APPROACH TO 953(B) 
A. Interpreting the Text of Section 953(b) 
Section 953(b) instructs the SEC to amend 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 
(Regulation S-K, Item 402) to require issuers to disclose, in any filing 
described in 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(a) (Regulation S-K, Item 10): 
(A) the median of the annual total compensation of all employees of the issuer, 
except the chief executive officer (or any equivalent position) of the issuer; (B) 
the annual total compensation of the chief executive officer (or any equivalent 
position) of the issuer; and 
(C) the ratio of the amount described in subparagraph (A) to the amount 
described in subparagraph (B).15 
The Act further states that “[f]or purposes of this subsection, the total 
compensation of an employee of an issuer shall be determined in 
accordance with section 229.402(c)(2)(x) of title 17, Code of Federal 
Regulations, as in effect on the day before the date of enactment of this 
Act.”16 CFR Section 229.402(c)(2)(x) provides a formula for the disclosure 
of chief executive officer total compensation in company proxy statements. 
Section 953(b) notably calls for disclosure of “median” employee 
compensation levels. In contrast to the average or “mean” statistic, the 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, supra 
note 1. 
16 Id. 
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median is considered to be a more reliable statistical description of skewed 
distributions, such as a sample of income data when there are highly 
compensated outliers in the population.17 
While Section 953(b) is clear on how the total compensation of an 
employee is to be calculated, it does not specify how the “median” is to be 
measured. As discussed below, Section 953(b)’s silence on the term 
“median” gives the SEC the necessary regulatory flexibility to permit 
companies to use statistical sampling to determine the median. 
B. Chevron Deference and the Use of Statistics in Administrative Agency 
Rules 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a two-step test under which 
courts are to defer to the interpretations of a law supplied by an 
administrative agency tasked with implementing that law. Under the 
Chevron doctrine, a reviewing court will ask first whether the meaning of a 
statute is clear or whether “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue.”18 If the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court will 
secondly ask whether the agency’s interpretation is “reasonable” and 
whether it is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”19 If both 
of these requirements are met, the court will defer to the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute, rather than supplying the court’s own.20 
In Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., the Supreme Court 
established that Chevron deference is pertinent when an administrative 
agency issues regulations that specify the procedure by which a statutorily 
mandated statistical test is to be performed. In Zuni, the statute in question 
called for the Secretary of Education to make certain funding decisions that 
required identifying school districts in each state “with per-pupil 
expenditures . . . above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of 
such expenditures . . . in the State.”21 Because the law at issue in Zuni did 
not specify how these percentiles were to be calculated, the Secretary of 
                                                                                                                           
 
17 See GEORGE W. SNEDECOR & WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 136 (8th ed. 
1989). 
18 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 843. 
21 Id. at 84 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000)). 
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Education promulgated regulations stating that the percentiles were to be 
calculated by ranking every student in the state based on how much funding 
that student received, and then finding which districts the lowest 5% and 
the highest 5% of students were in and excluding those.22 
The plaintiffs in Zuni were several school districts that received less 
funding under the Secretary’s method of calculating percentiles than they 
would have under an alternate methodology, which they claimed was the 
only permissible reading of the statute.23 The plaintiffs argued that this 
statutory language required the Secretary to rank the districts in order from 
lowest per-pupil funding to highest and calculate the percentiles treating 
each district as a single unit, regardless of the number of students in it. 
Nevertheless, the Court found that the statute, by simply calling for a 
calculation based on certain percentiles, left sufficient ambiguity to permit 
the agency to issue regulations providing procedures for calculating those 
percentiles.24 As part of its justification for this stance, the Court quoted 
from a number of dictionaries and professional manuals to indicate that the 
term “percentile” is open to a variety of meanings and calculation 
techniques.25 Notably, one of these sources, quoted directly by the Court, 
was the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Mathematics, which stated that in 
some instances, percentiles can be “applicable to . . . a large sample ranked 
in ascending order.”26 
The Court further found that the procedures provided by the regulation 
were a reasonable interpretation of the statute.27 In support of this 
conclusion, the Court reasoned that calculation methods such as this are 
“the kind of highly technical, specialized interstitial matter that Congress 
often does not decide itself, but delegates to specialized agencies to 
decide.”28 Finally, the Court examined the legislative history of the statute, 
and found nothing to suggest that the Secretary’s interpretation and 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 Id. 
23 Zuni, 550 U.S. 81, 88–89 (2007). 
24 Id. at 99. 
25 Id. at 95. 
26 Id. (quoting CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM & JAMES NICHOLSON, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
MATHEMATICS 378–79 (3d ed. 2005)). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 90. 
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calculation technique would run counter to the intent of Congress in passing 
the law.29 
C. Section 953(b) Is “Silent or Ambiguous” on the Methods to Be Used in 
Calculating the Median of the Annual Total Compensation of All 
Employees of an Issuer 
Section 953(b), by calling for reporting of median employee 
compensation but not specifying how that median is to be calculated, “is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to [that] specific issue.”30 Where the 
drafters of Section 953(b) wanted to be explicit about calculation 
methodologies, they clearly knew how to do so. Section 953(b)(2) 
specifically provides for the exact values to be used in calculating the total 
value of the median employee’s compensation. That Congress did not use 
this same level of specificity to describe the statistical procedures for 
identifying the median suggests that this is “the kind of highly technical, 
specialized interstitial matter that Congress often does not decide itself, but 
delegates to specialized agencies to decide.”31 
The only way in which this language could be viewed as specific 
enough to provide the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,”32 
would be if the word “median” possessed a single, clear definition that 
explicitly included procedures for calculating it in a situation such as this. 
The Supreme Court in Zuni recognized that there may be multiple ways of 
analyzing a large set of multi-variable figures, and thus rejected the notion 
that a single term could fully encapsulate the complexities of modern 
statistical practices.33 As the Court remarked: 
We are not experts in statistics, but a statistician is not needed to see what the 
dictionary does not say. No dictionary definition we have found suggests that 
there is any single logical, mathematical, or statistical link between, on the one 
hand, the characterizing data (used for ranking purposes) and, on the other hand, 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 Zuni, 550 U.S. at 90. 
30 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
31 See Zuni, 550 U.S. at 94. 
32 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
33 Zuni, 550 U.S. at 95. 
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the nature of the relevant population or how that population might be weighted 
for purposes of determining a percentile cutoff.34 
Moreover, the fact that Section 953(b) calls for the SEC to implement 
its disclosure provisions by regulation indicates that Congress anticipated 
the SEC would play a role in shaping the implementation specifics for this 
provision. Section 953(b) could have bypassed regulation altogether by 
simply making its disclosure requirements mandatory as a matter of law. 
Alternatively, Section 953(b) could have provided specific language to 
insert into the regulation, stipulating that the SEC was to insert that 
language and no more. Yet, Section 953(b) does neither of these. 
Instead, Section 953(b) calls for its provisions to be incorporated into 
Reg. S-K Item 402, which is itself a complex, yet at times flexible 
document, created through years of discretionary rulemaking by the SEC. 
Throughout Reg. S-K, Item 402 the SEC provides clarification for 
calculation techniques.35 Item 402 also provides for exceptions and 
flexibility in certain circumstances.36 
Indeed, it would seem quite unusual for new provisions to be added to 
Item 402 in a way that denied the SEC any discretion in issuing the specific 
instructions and guidance that characterize the document. There is nothing 
to suggest that this is what Congress intended Section 953(b) require. Thus, 
in no way does Section 953(b) “unambiguously express[] [the] intent of 
Congress,” with regards to every methodological detail for performing the 
statistical calculations it mandates. Rather, Section 953(b) identifies a clear 
objective of information to be disclosed and then provides great specificity 
with regards to some aspects of its application while leaving others to the 
practical experience and technical expertise of the SEC to implement. 
                                                                                                                           
 
34 Id. at 96 (emphasis in the original). 
35 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R § 229.402 (2011), Instructions to Item 402(c)(2)(viii) (providing procedures 
for calculating the value of interest on deferred compensation). 
36 See, e.g., id. at Instructions to Item 402(a)(3) (exempting reporting on executives making less 
than $100,000/year). 
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D. The Use of Statistical Sampling to Calculate the Median Is a 
“Reasonable” Interpretation of Section 953(b) and Therefore Would 
Receive Chevron Deference 
Given then that Section 953(b) contains ambiguity with regards to 
calculating the median, the next question under the Chevron analysis is 
whether the SEC’s resolution of that ambiguity by implementing a 
statistical sampling methodology would be a “permissible construction of 
the statute.”37 As society and administrative processes have become more 
complex and data driven, the use of statistics within government functions 
has increased. Numerous laws38 and even larger numbers of regulations39 
now mention the use of statistical calculations. Because statistics is a vast 
and often highly technical subject matter, it is not surprising that Congress 
has generally not attempted to precisely define in legislation how particular 
calculations are to be performed.40 
By the standards established in Chevron and Zuni, a regulation 
implementing Section 953(b) by use of a statistical sampling technique to 
calculate median employee compensation would clearly be a permissible 
interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act. Again, Zuni is very closely analogous 
in that it upheld an agency’s procedures for calculating a statistic whose use 
was required by statute.41 In fact, the Secretary of Education’s regulations 
in question in Zuni permitted the use of statistical sampling for counting the 
number of pupils in each school district. The regulations provided that the 
number of pupils in each district, an essential number for determining the 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
38 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1703 (2006) (referencing median house price); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3 
(2006) (referencing water safety standards calibrated to the 90th percentile of sampling); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395x (2012) (capping payments for health services at 105% of the median payments for such 
services); etc. 
39 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 799.9120 (2011) (providing for the use of medians in toxic substance 
tests); 7 C.F.R. § 246.7 (2011) (restricting certain payments to families below 50% of the median 
income in an area); 10 C.F.R. § 835.2 (2011) (requiring calculation of median particle size within an 
aerosol); etc. 
40 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 8624 (2006) (restricting certain federal aid payments to families below 
60% of state median income, but not specifying calculation procedures for that median figure). See also 
45 C.F.R. § 96.85 (2011) (a regulation implementing 42 U.S.C. § 8624 and specifying the procedures 
for calculating the required median figures). 
41 Zuni, 550 U.S. 81. 
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percentiles, was to be calculated “in accordance with whatever standard 
measurement of pupil count is used in the State.”42 
Such state methods in Zuni often use sampling and estimation 
techniques.43 Furthermore, not only did the procedures in Zuni also involve 
the potential use of statistical sampling, the regulation in question actually 
delegated to a group of third parties, the states, the task of deciding whether 
and how the sampling would be conducted.44 Thus, in many ways Zuni 
upheld a regulation that provided for a far broader range of interpretation of 
the original statute than would be the case in this situation, in which the 
SEC could specify the procedures for the statistical sampling rather than 
delegating the decision to third parties. 
Section 953(b) and the statute at issue in Zuni are far from the only 
instances in which statutes call for the use of statistical measures without 
specifying procedures for their calculation, thereby leaving administrative 
agencies to fill in the specifics via regulation. For instance, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 8624 provides for a Low Income Energy Assistance Program, funded by 
the federal government but administered by states. The law specifies that 
payments cannot go to households with incomes above “60 percent of the 
State median income.”45 The law says nothing more about this “median 
income” figure or how it is to be calculated. A regulation, however, 
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services, specifies 
that this calculation can be made using “state median income estimates.”46 
The federal government, based on a sampling procedure conducted by the 
U.S. Census, generates these state median income estimates.47 
                                                                                                                           
 
42 Id. at 103; Appendix A. 
43 See, e.g., Michigan’s provisions, MCLS § 388.1606(4) (Bender 2011) (providing for estimation 
of school district populations based on attendance figures for all pupils for every school day statewide, 
but rather on two annual “pupil membership count day[s].”). 
44 Zuni, 550 U.S. at 103; Appendix A. 
45 42 U.S.C. § 8624 (2006). 
46 45 C.F.R. § 96.85 (2011). 
47 See State Median Income Estimate for a Four-Person Family: Notice of the Federal Fiscal Year 
(FFY) 2011 State Median Income Estimates for Use Under the Low Income Home Energy Assistance 
Program (LIHEAP), 75 Fed. Reg. 26780–82 (May 12, 2010); see also U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 
Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Design and Methodology, American 
Community Survey (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/methodology/methodology_ 
main/ for a description of the Census’ sampling methodology and statistical estimation techniques. 
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An additional reason why statistical estimation techniques of the 
median are a reasonable interpretation of Section 953(b) is that Reg. S-K, 
Item 402, the regulation that Section 953(b) modifies, already makes use of 
estimation techniques for other figures it requires issuers to disclose. For 
instance, the instructions to Item 402(c)(2)(vii), Section 2(A), provides for 
the reporting of the actuarial present value of accumulated pension benefits. 
Such an actuarial valuation is by definition an estimate, based upon 
educated guesses concerning life expectancy, interest rates, and so on. The 
fact that Item 402 already makes use of estimation techniques for reported 
figures further supports the notion that the additional Item 402 reporting 
requirements under Section 953(b) could be calculated using estimation 
techniques. 
The use of sampling techniques to implement Section 953(b) is also a 
reasonable statutory interpretation because it comports with well-
established practices in statistical calculations of median income. 
Calculations of median income are in fact one of the most common 
instances in which statistical sampling techniques are used to estimate a 
median value.48 As noted above, such sampling and estimation is used by 
the U.S. Census in its calculations. The Bureau of Labor Statistics also uses 
a similar methodology.49 
III. RECOMMENDED SAMPLING PROCEDURE AND ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
A. Overview of Procedure 
This section presents a simple procedure that will enable any company, 
through random sampling, to produce an estimate of its median 
compensation with a high degree of confidence. The degree of precision of 
this estimate can be made a function of the sample size, and the SEC in 
consultation with businesses and the public can select the size that best 
balances the costs and benefits of this mandated reporting. 
Any company that wishes to estimate its median compensation can 
accomplish this by taking a random sample of its employees, calculating the 
                                                                                                                           
 
48 See SNEDECOR & COCHRAN, supra note 17. 
49 See Technical Notes for May 2010 OES Estimates, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_tec.htm for a description of its methodology. 
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compensation for each of those employees, and finding the median of that 
sample. A company can conduct such a sampling by assigning a unique 
identifying number to each of the company’s employees and then using a 
computer to randomly select a given number of those identifiers. More 
complicated procedures, such as stratified sampling, will be unnecessary, 
regardless of the size of a company, how many countries it operates in, or 
how many subsidiaries it has. 
The sample median generated through this process, for any odd-sized 
sample, will be a median-unbiased estimate of the company’s true median 
compensation.50 This means that the sample median will be no more likely 
to overestimate the true median than it is to underestimate it, and thus does 
not contain any “bias” to err in one direction more often than another.51 
Even a sample as small as 199 individuals will enable a company to achieve 
a 90% confidence level that the true median will be between the 89th and 
111th entries in the sample, ranked by compensation.52 This will enable 
most companies to produce an estimate of their true median compensation 
that is, at a 90% confidence level, within $1300 of the actual median 
compensation. Larger samples would allow even greater levels of 
confidence and precision, as detailed below. 
B. Procedural Details 
Through the use of basic laws of probability, as outlined in Appendix 
A, it can be shown that if a company randomly selects a sample of N 
employees and computes the total compensation for each employee, then 
the company’s level of confidence that the true median compensation will 
be between the kth largest and the kth smallest value in the sample is given 
                                                                                                                           
 
50 M. Mahamunulu Desu & R.H. Rodine, Estimation of the Population Median, SCANDINAVIAN 
ACTUARIAL J. 67–70 (1969). 
51 George Brown, On Small-Sample Estimation, 18 THE ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STAT. 583 
(1947). 
52 See generally MORRIS H. DEGROOT & MARK J. SCHERVISH, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 
487, 491–93 (4th ed. 2010) (providing a technical discussion on the meaning and interpretation of 
confidence intervals). 
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¦ .53 Using this formula, whose meaning and derivation 
are explained in Appendix A, the following table lists different sample sizes 
and corresponding levels of confidence and precision that they yield for an 
estimate of the true median. Thus, for example, if N = 199, and k = 89, a 
company could take a sample of 199 employees, rank them in ascending 
order of compensation, and thereby achieve 90% confidence that its true 
median compensation will be between the compensation of the 89th and the 
111th individuals in the sample. 
 
Table 1—Exact k-Values for Confidence Intervals 
 
Sample Size 90% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval 
 k - value k - value 
N = 99 k = 42 k = 40 
N = 199 k = 89 k = 86 
N = 399 k = 184 k = 180 
N = 499 k = 232 k = 228 
N = 999 k = 474 k = 469 
 
These figures, however, only indicate that the median is likely to be 
between certain ranked values of the sample. They do not indicate how 
wide the range is likely to be in absolute dollar terms. Of course, any 
company that applies this methodology would immediately be able to 
determine the level of compensation of the kth lowest and kth highest paid 
employees in their sample, and so the dollar value that describes the width 
of the interval would be easy to report. Nevertheless, in determining the 
appropriate values to set for N and k, the SEC will likely want to 
prospectively consider how wide of intervals, in dollar terms, different 
values of N and k will produce. Clearly, this will be a matter for 
                                                                                                                           
 
53 See generally JOHN A. RICE, MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND DATA ANALYSIS 395–97 (3d 
ed. 2007) (providing a general procedure for calculating confidence intervals for medians, upon which 
the methodology in this article is based). 
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cost/benefit consideration that the SEC will be best poised to conduct with 
input from companies and the public. 
The ideal would be for private companies or trade associations with 
access to employee compensation databases to work with the SEC as it 
implements this rule by using their databases to test the results from 
different values of N and k. Barring this, however, it is possible to generate 
simulated databases of employee compensation levels in order to estimate 
how wide in dollar terms the confidence levels produced by this procedure 
would be, were it applied to actual companies. 
Using reasonable assumptions about the distribution of a company’s 
compensation, as detailed in Appendix B, it can be shown that the 
confidence bands around the sample median would be of the size given in 
the table below: 
 
Table 2—Estimated Margins of Error for Simulated Company 
 
Sample Size Margin of Error 
90% Confidence Level 
Margin of Error 
95% Confidence Level 
N = 99 +/- $1905 +/- $2444 
N = 199 +/- $1286 +/- $1668 
N = 399 +/- $938 +/- $1178 
N = 499 +/- $842 +/- $1035 
N = 999 +/- $607 +/- $725 
 
Thus, as can be seen, a relatively small sample can generate a narrow 
band that predicts the population median with a high degree of confidence. 
The advantage of this procedure is that it is robust to different possible 
distributions of an employer’s compensation. Although the dollar value that 
designates the size of the confidence intervals may vary from company to 
company, all companies will have the same level of confidence for the 
interval between the kth smallest and kth largest entry in a sample of a 
given size N. Nevertheless, it is certainly plausible that a particular 
company, with more detailed knowledge of its unique distribution of 
employee compensation, may be able to devise another sampling procedure 
that achieves predictions of comparable precision and accuracy to those 
specified here. Thus, the SEC could also specify in its rulemaking that if 
any company devises another procedure that it can demonstrate generates a 
median-unbiased estimator of the median within an X% confidence interval 
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of +/- $Y of the estimated median, with the SEC selecting values for X and 
Y to best fit its cost/benefit analysis, then the company can substitute that 
estimator and procedure for this one specified here.  
CONCLUSION 
Section 953(b) does not specify how issuers must calculate the median 
of the annual total compensation of all employees. Because the median is a 
statistical term used to describe a set of observations, it is reasonable for the 
SEC to permit issuers to sample their employee populations to calculate the 
median. This approach will provide accurate information to investors with 
reduced compliance costs for issuers. 
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APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF FORMULA FOR THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE 
BETWEEN THE KTH SMALLEST AND KTH LARGEST VALUES IN A SAMPLE OF 
SIZE N 
The median is the value in a distribution that is greater than or equal to 
exactly half of the other values and less than or equal to exactly half of the 
other values. This special feature of the median lends itself very well to 
establishing a precise confidence interval for a company’s true median 
compensation, based on taking just a small sample of employees and 
measuring their total compensation. 
To start out with, suppose a company randomly and independently 
selects a sample of fifty employees and wants to know what the probability 
is that the true median compensation level is somewhere between the 
compensation levels for the lowest paid employee and the highest paid 
employee. For every individual in the sample, there is a 50% chance that 
that individual’s compensation is below the true median and a 50% chance 
that that individual’s compensation is above the true median.54 Therefore 
the chance that all fifty employees in the sample have compensation above 
the true median (in other words, the probability that the true median is less 
than the smallest value in the sample) is given by 
501
2
§ ·¨ ¸© ¹ . Likewise, the 
chance that all fifty employees in the sample have compensation below the 
true median (in other words, the probability that the true median is greater 
than the largest value in the sample) is also given by 
501
2
§ ·¨ ¸© ¹ . Furthermore 
these two events are mutually exclusive—it is impossible for all fifty 
employees in the sample to have compensation that is both above and 
below the actual company median. Therefore, the probability that either of 
these conditions holds is simply the sum of the probabilities that each of 
them individually holds, which is given by: 
                                                                                                                           
 
54 Technical note: When sampling from an unknown continuous distribution, such as that of a 
company’s employees, the value of any given observation is considered to be a continuous random 
variable. In statistical theory, the probability that a continuous random variable will assume any single 
value is considered for technical reasons to be zero. Thus, this section will refer to the probability that an 
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50 50 50 491 1 1 1
+ = 2 • =
2 2 2 2
§ · § · § · § ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹ © ¹ © ¹ . 
In other words, if a company samples 50 employees and determines 
their individual compensations, then the probability that the company’s true 
median compensation will not be somewhere between the lowest and 
highest paid individuals is given by 
491
2
§ ·¨ ¸© ¹  = .000000000000002. Therefore, 
the company can achieve 99.9999999999998% confidence that the true 
median compensation will be somewhere between the lowest paid 
individual in the sample and the highest paid individual. By using the 
lowest and the highest compensations in the sample, the company will be 
able to achieve a 99.9999999999998% confidence interval for its true 
median compensation. 
Clearly then, by forming an estimate based on the smallest and largest 
compensations in a sample, a company can achieve a very high confidence 
level. In practice, however, there is likely to be quite a wide range between 
the lowest and the highest compensated individuals, even in a 50-person 
sample. Thus, achieving 99.9999999999998% confidence that the true 
median is somewhere within such a wide range will not be tremendously 
informative. This procedure can be easily extended, however, to give 
confidence percentages for smaller intervals within a sample. 
To start with, suppose that a company wants to know the probability 
that the true median will be somewhere between the 2nd and the 49th 
observations in its sample, when those observations are ranked from 
smallest to largest. As with before, it is useful to break this down into 
pieces. First off, consider the probability that the company calculates 
compensations for a sample of fifty employees and that forty-nine out of the 
fifty employees in the sample have compensation above the true median (in 
other words, the probability that the true median is below the compensation 
of at least forty-nine out of the fifty employees). This equals the probability 
that the company would draw 50 observations, all 50 of which are greater 
than the population median (since if all 50 are greater than the true median, 
then it is also true that 49 are greater than the true median), plus the 
                                                                                                                           
 
individual employee has compensation that is less than the true median, rather than the probability that 
an employee has compensation that is less than or equal to the median. See id. at 396. 
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probability that the company would draw 50 observations, with exactly 49 
of them greater than the true median. The first of these two probabilities 
was already calculated above as 
501
2
§ ·¨ ¸© ¹ . 
For the second probability, there are 50 different combinations that 
could produce this because any of the fifty employees in the sample could 
be the lone employee whose compensation is less than the true median. For 
any given employee in the sample, the chance that their compensation is 
less than the true median is 50%, and the chance that all other 49 employees 
have compensations greater than the true median is 
491
2
§ ·¨ ¸© ¹ . Thus, the 
probability that that one particular employee’s compensation is below the 
true median, and that all other employees have compensations above the 
true median is given by: 
49 501 1 1
• =
2 2 2
§ · § · § ·
¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹ © ¹ . But, since there are fifty 
different employees for whom this could be true, the probability that any 
one employee has compensation below the true median, while all others 





¨ ¸© ¹ . 
In situations such as this, where all of the different possible 
combinations that could satisfy a condition are added up, mathematicians 
use the binomial coefficient to represent the number of possibilities. In the 
case of calculating how many different combinations of one employee can 
be drawn out of a sample of 50 employees (i.e. how many different ways 
there could be exactly one employee whose compensation is below the 




, which is read 










j! n− j( )!: for n  j  0, where the factorial operator “!” 
signifies  n!= n(n -1)(n - 2)...(1)  and where by convention 0! = 1. Many 
standard calculators and computer programs also have built-in functions for 






. Thus, the probability that exactly one employee in a sample will 
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have compensation below the true median is given by the number of 
possible combinations that could produce this (fifty), times the probability 
of any one of the possibilities 
501
2
§ ·§ ·¨ ¸¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹© ¹ . In other words, the probability that 
exactly one employee in a sample will have compensation below the true 
median is given by: 
50 5050 1 1
• = 50 •
1 2 2
§ · § · § ·
¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹ © ¹© ¹
, exactly as before but now 
written using the binomial coefficient. 
In fact, the binomial coefficient is implicitly present in the calculation 
of the probability that exactly fifty employees have compensation above the 
true median (in other words, the probability that exactly zero employees 
have compensation below the true median). In this case, the binomial 




 (note that there is only one way to 
choose exactly zero items out of a sample of fifty). Thus, the probability 
that all fifty employees will have compensation below the true median is 
given by 
50 5050 1 1
• = 1•
1 2 2
§ · § · § ·
¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹ © ¹© ¹
, again, exactly as before. 
Putting all of these calculations together then, the probability that the 
true median will be less than the 2nd ranked sample compensation (i.e. the 













































where here, k = 2 because the procedure is calculating the probability that 
the true median is less than the 2nd ranked sample. 
As with above, the problem is symmetrical and therefore the 
probability that the true median will be greater than the 49th ranked 
employee in the sample (i.e. the second highest) is the same as the 
probability that the true median will be less than the 2nd ranked employee 
in the sample. Thus, the probability that the true median will be between the 































¦ , which equals 0.99999999999991. 
Thus, a company would be able to report a 99.999999999991% confidence 
interval for their true median compensation by giving the interval bounded 
2012-2013] STATISTICAL SAMPLING 131 
 
Vol. 31 (2012-2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.43 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
by the second lowest and the second highest compensations in a sample 
they took of 50 employees. 
Finally then, this formula can be completely generalized. For a sample 
size of N, the confidence level that the true median is between the kth 
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APPENDIX B: DERIVATION OF SIZES OF CONFIDENCE BANDS FOR 
SIMULATED COMPANIES 
In order to generate simulated employee compensation databases, it is 
necessary to make certain assumptions about the underlying distribution of 
employee compensation within companies. It is widely known that income 
within the population as a whole tends to be distributed in a log-normal 
form.55 In such a distribution, there are a large number of employees who 
make low to medium salaries and a small number of employees who make 
very large salaries. Given the distribution of income within the population 
as a whole, it is a reasonable assumption that intra-company compensation 
distributions are also approximately log-normal.56 
In formal mathematical terms, a log-normal distribution is created by 
taking a constant value and raising it to the power of each value found 
within a normal distribution. Thus, if Y is a normally distributed variable, 
with a mean of ȝ and a variance of ı2, then Z = eY will be a log-normally 
distributed variable, that is, ln Z( ) ~ N µ,σ 2( ).57 Thus, the only parameters 
whose values must be assumed in order to generate a simulated employee 
database with log-normally distributed compensation, are ȝ and ı2. 
The mean or expected value of a log-normally distributed population is 
given by E z( ) = eµ+σ 2 /2 .58 The median of a normal distribution is equal to 
its mean, and because the exponential function does not change the ordering 
of numbers it is applied to, the median of a log-normal distribution is 
simply eµ. 
Given these properties, an approximately 100,000 person company 
with a log-normal wage distribution that has a mean compensation of 
around $33,000 per year, a median compensation of around $5000 per year, 
and a CEO paid around $15,000,000 per year, would have approximate 
                                                                                                                           
 
55 See, e.g., Ronald Oaxaca & Michael Ransom, Using Econometric Models for Intrafirm Equity 
Salary Adjustments, J. ECON. INEQUAL. 230 (Dec. 2003). 
56 Id. 
57 R. CARTER HILL, WILLIAM E. GRIFFITHS & GUAY C. LIM, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMETRICS 103 
(3d ed. 2008). 
58 Id. at 104. 
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values µ=8.5 and . In order to generate the dollar estimates for the margins 
of error provided in Table 2, these values were inserted into a Monte Carlo 
simulation that created 10,000 simulated companies with log-normally 
distributed compensation according to values of ȝ = 8.5 and ı2=3.8. Each of 
these 10,000 simulated companies was then randomly sampled, using 
sample sizes as indicated in the table. Finally, the difference between the 
kth smallest and the kth largest values in each of the samples was taken, 
and the median of the 10,000 differences from the simulated companies was 
calculated. The margins of error in the table are each one-half the size of 
these median figures. 
